By Charles Siewert
PhenlThoughtProof.pdf
In Cognitive Phenomenology, edited by Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague, Oxford University Press, 2011.
Three broad themes run through the volume. First, some authors focus on the question of how the notion of cognitive phenomenology ought to be understood. How should the notion of cognitive phenomenology be defined? Are there different kinds of cognitive phenomenology? A second theme concerns the existence of cognitive phenomenology. Some contributors defend the existence of a distinctive cognitive phenomenology, whereas others deny it. The arguments for and against the existence of cognitive phenomenology raise questions concerning the nature of first-person knowledge of thought, the relationship between consciousness and intentionality, and the scope of the explanatory gap. A third theme concerns the implications of the cognitive phenomenology debate. What are the implications of the debate for accounts of our introspective access to conscious thought and for accounts of the very nature of conscious thought? Cognitive Phenomenology brings the debate to the forefront of philosophy, and provides a state-of-the-art account of the issues at stake.
Table of Contents
Contents
Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction, Michelle Montague and Tim Bayne
The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology, Peter Carruthers and Benedicte Veillet
From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed, Terry Horgan
Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content, Uriah Kriegel
On The Phenomenology of Thought, Joseph Levine
The Phenomenology of Particularity, Michelle Montague
Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content, David Pitt
The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology, Jesse Prinz
A Frugal View of Cognitive Phenomenology, William Robinson
On Behalf of Cognitive Qualia, Christopher Shields
Phenomenal Thought, Charles Siewert
Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology, Maja Spener
Cognitive Phenomenology: real life, Galen Strawson
Is There a Phenomenology of Thought?, Michael Tye and Briggs Wright
Phenomenology of Consciously Thinking, David Woodruff-Smith