Robert Alan and Kathryn Dunlevie Hayes Professor of Humanities and Professor of Philosophy at Rice University

pdf 01. The Significance of Consciousness

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01. The Significance of Consciousness

Princeton University Press, 1998.

SignificanceOfBook Charles Siewert presents a distinctive approach to consciousness that emphasizes our first-person knowledge of experience and argues that we should grant consciousness, understood in this way, a central place in our conception of mind and intentionality.


David Chalmers:

"This is a marvelous book, full of subtle, thoughtful, and original argument.... The discussion is full of insight and a pleasure to read. Siewert's book advances the debate over consciousness on a number of fronts, and should become a standard in the field.

BOOK LINK: Princeton Press

pdf 02. Respecting Appearances

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02. Respecting Appearances

Forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology, edited by Dan Zahavi, Oxford University Press, 2012.

 

The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology presents twenty-eight essays by some of the leading figures in the field, and gives an authoritative overview of the type of work and range of topics found and discussed in contemporary phenomenology. The essays aim to articulate and develop original theoretical perspectives. Some of them are concerned with issues and questions typical and distinctive of phenomenological philosophy, while others address questions familiar to analytic philosophers, but do so with arguments and ideas taken from phenomenology. Some offer detailed analyses of concrete phenomena; others take a more comprehensive perspective and seek to outline and motivate the future direction of phenomenology. The handbook will be a rich source of insight and stimulation for philosophers, students of philosophy, and for people working in other disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, who are interested in the state of phenomenology today. It is the definitive guide to what is currently going on in phenomenology. It includes discussions of such diverse topics as intentionality, embodiment, perception, naturalism, temporality, self-consciousness, language, knowledge, ethics, politics, art and religion, and will make it clear that phenomenology, far from being a tradition of the past, is alive and in a position to make valuable contributions to contemporary thought.

pdf 03. In Favor of (Plain) Phenomenology

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03. In Favor of (Plain) Phenomenology

In Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences: Special Issue on Dennett and Heterophenomenology, Vol. 6 Nos.1-2 March 2007.

pdf 04. Who’s Afraid of Phenomenological Disputes?

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04. Who’s Afraid of Phenomenological Disputes?

In Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XLV, Supplement, 2007.

pdf 05. Socratic Introspection and the Abundance of Experience

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05. Socratic Introspection and the Abundance of Experience

 Journal of Consciousness Studies: Describing Inner Experience: a Symposium Debating Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES), Vol. 18, No. 1, January 2011.

pdf 06. Phenomenal Thought

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06. Phenomenal Thought

In Cognitive Phenomenology, edited by Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague, Oxford University Press, 2011.


Oxford University Press, 30 nov. 2011 - 360 pages
 
 
It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory phenomenology and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive 'cognitive phenomenology'--that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume presents new work by leading philosophers in the field, and addresses the question of whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology. It also includes a number of essays which consider whether cognitive phenomenology is part of conscious perception and conscious emaotion.  READ MORE
 

pdf 07. What Dennett Can’t Imagine and Why

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07. What Dennett Can’t Imagine and Why

In Inquiry 36: 96-112, March 1993.

Abstract

Woven into Dennett's account of consciousness is his belief that certain possibilities are not conceivable. This is manifested in his view that we are not conscious in any sense in which we can imagine that philosophers’ ‘zombies’ might not be conscious, and also in his claims about ‘blindsight’, and what possibilities this can coherently suggest to us. If the possibilities Dennett denies none the less seem conceivable to us, then if he does not give us reason to think they are actually incoherent, we ought to reject his theory, since it denies the intelligibility of the very notion we should want a theory of consciousness to discuss. I argue that Dennett does not provide us with convincing reasons of the relevant sort, and I suggest that his difficulty with the concept of consciousness is rooted in questionable epistemological assumptions which he fails to justify.

pdf 08. Saving Appearances: a Dilemma for Physicalists

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08. Saving Appearances: a Dilemma for Physicalists

In The Waning of Materialism: New Essays, edited by George Bealer and Robert Koons, Oxford University Press, 2010.

 

“Saving Appearances: a Dilemma for Physicalists,” in The Waning of Materialism: New Essays, edited by George Bealer and Robert Koons, Oxford University Press, 2010. 

Twenty-three philosophers examine the doctrine of materialism find it wanting. The case against materialism comprises arguments from conscious experience, from the unity and identity of the person, from intentionality, mental causation, and knowledge. The contributors include leaders in the fields of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology, who respond ably to the most recent versions and defences of materialism. The modal arguments of Kripke and Chalmers, Jackson>'s knowledge argument, Kim>'s exclusion problem, and Burge>'s anti-individualism all play a part in the building of a powerful cumulative case against the materialist research program. Several papers address the implications of contemporary brain and cognitive research (the psychophysics of color perception, blindsight, and the effects of commissurotomies), adding a posteriori arguments to the classical a priori critique of reductionism. All of the current versions of materialism -- reductive and non-reductive, functionalist, eliminativist, and new wave materialism -- come under sustained and trenchant attack. In addition, a wide variety of alternatives to the materialist conception of the person receive new and illuminating attention, including anti-materialist versions of naturalism, property dualism, Aristotelian and Thomistic hylomorphism, and non-Cartesian accounts of substance dualism.

pdf 09. Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness

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09. Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness

Forthcoming in Phenomenal Intentionality, edited by Uriah Kriegel, Oxford University Press.

From the Introduction:

Does consciousness essentially include self-consciousness? How you answer may determine your basic view of consciousness and its relation to intentionality. For example, if you say yes, you may think this paves the way to accounting for consciousness in terms of a self-directed, inward-pointing
intentionality: consciousness not only includes but is exhausted by a kind of selfconsciousness— that is, a way in which a mind refers to or represents itself. On the other hand, you may object that consciousness—at least in the phenomenal sense—either does not necessarily involve self-consciousness at all, or else not in a way that licenses us to absorb consciousness into self-representation; if anything, self-consciousness is to be understood as a form of phenomenal consciousness. These matters need more spelling out. But it’s fairly clear that how we deal with them will significantly shape our approach to the subject of this volume. Other broad issues are at stake as well, such as: how to conceive of the basis of self-knowledge; and in what sense, if any, one is conscious of or experiences one’s “self.”

default 10. Consciousness and Intentionality

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In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward Zalta (http://plato.stanford.edu) June 2002 (revised December 2006).

 

Introduction

To say one has an experience that is conscious (in the phenomenal sense) is to say that one is in a state of its seeming to one some way. In another formulation, to say experience is conscious is to say that there is something it's like for one to have it. Feeling pain and sensing colors are common illustrations of phenomenally conscious states. Consciousness has also been taken to consist in the monitoring of one's own states of mind (e.g., by forming thoughts about them, or by somehow "sensing" them), or else in the accessability of information to one's capacities for rational control or self-report. Intentionality has to do with the directedness or aboutness of mental states — the fact that, for example, one's thinking is of or about something. Intentionality includes, and is sometimes taken to be equivalent to, what is called ‘mental representation.’

It can seem that consciousness and intentionality pervade mental life — perhaps one or both somehow constitute what it is to have a mind. But achieving an articulate general understanding of either consciousness or intentionality presents an enormous challenge, part of which lies in figuring out how the two are related. Is one in some sense derived from or dependent on the other? Or are they perhaps quite independent and separate aspects of mind?

Sections (1) and (2) offer introductory accounts of what is meant by ‘consciousness’ and ‘intentionality,’ with sensitivity to the difficulties raised by their varying interpretation. Then, influential perspectives on intentionality that have emerged in both phenomenological (Section 3) and analytic (Section 4) philosophical traditions are sketched, so as to highlight basic issues about the relationship of consciousness and intentionality, and provide some of the background against which they have been understood. Sections (5) through (8) survey some contemporary views about consciousness, considering their implications for the connection between consciousness and intentionality. Section (9) distinguishes four broad options for understanding their relationship, and closes with some observations about the philosophical consequences of choosing among them.

pdf 11. Consciousness, Natural Representation, and First-Person Warrant: Reply to Dretske

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11. Consciousness, Natural Representation, and First-Person Warrant: Reply to Dretske

Psyche 10 (03), November 2004.

pdf 12. Phenomenality and Intentionality: Which Explains Which? Reply to Gertler

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12. Phenomenality and Intentionality: Which Explains Which? Reply to Gertler

Psyche 10 (02), October 2004.

pdf 13. Consciousness, Intentionality, and Concepts: Reply to Nelkin

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13. Consciousness, Intentionality, and Concepts: Reply to Nelkin

Psyche 10 (02), September 2004.

pdf 14. “First-Person Reflection and Hidden Physical Features: Reply to Witmer”

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14. “First-Person Reflection and Hidden Physical Features: Reply to Witmer”

Psyche 9(06), February 2003.

pdf 15. “Eliminativism, First-Person Knowledge, and Phenomenal Intentionality: Reply to Levine”

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15. “Eliminativism, First-Person Knowledge, and Phenomenal Intentionality: Reply to Levine”

Psyche 9(03) January 2003.

pdf 16. “Phenomenality, Intentionality, and Reflexivity: Replies to Ludwig and Thomasson”

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16. “Phenomenality, Intentionality, and Reflexivity: Replies to Ludwig and Thomasson”

Psyche 8(09) October 2002.

pdf 17. “Consciousness Neglect and Inner Sense: Reply to Lycan”

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17. “Consciousness Neglect and Inner Sense: Reply to Lycan”

Psyche, 7 (07) April 2001.

pdf 18. “Spontaneous Blindsight and Immediate Availability: Reply to Carruthers”

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18. “Spontaneous Blindsight and Immediate Availability: Reply to Carruthers”

Psyche 7 (07) April 2001.

pdf 19. “Is the Appearance of Shape Protean?”

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19. “Is the Appearance of Shape Protean?”

Psyche 12 (3) July 2006

pdf 21. “Is Visual Experience Rich or Poor?”

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21. “Is Visual Experience Rich or Poor?”

In The Journal of Consciousness Studies, Special Issue: “Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?”,  Vol. 9, No. 5-6, 2002.

© 2020 Charles Siewert. All Rights Reserved.